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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RULON R. WEST, 
Plaintiff and Appellant~ 
vs. 
TERRY R. WEST and FLORA E. 
WEST, 





1 Case No. 
10251 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for dissolution and winding up 
of a partnership, and distribution of its assets. Follow-
ing a prior appeal the case was remanded and the trial 
court directed to make findings with respect to the 
actual intent of the partners when they executed two 
ambiguous documents: Articles of Partnership (Ex-
hibit I) and a Dissolution Agreement (Exhibit 2). 
1 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a trial without a jury the court ordered that 
the books of the partners be adjusted to provide, among 
other things, that the amounts plaintiff advanced to the 
partnership subsequent to December 8, 1958 ($29,-
645.39 of approximately $150,000.00 paid in by him) 
should be repaid with interest; but that the balance 
' subject to minor adjustments, be distributed 40% to 
plaintiff, 407o to defendant Terry R. West, and 20% 
to defendant Flora E. West. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment of the trial 
court and remand of the case to· the District Court of 
Salt Lake County for entry of a decree directing the 
court-appointed receiver to pay to the plaintiff the 
sums provided in the judgment of the court dated Feb-
ruary 27, 1963; to return to the plaintiff, subject to 
the minor adjustments agreed to by plaintiff, all sums 
paid into the partnership, with interest, to the extent 
that assets are available; and to divide the surplus, if 
any, on the basis of 407o to plaintiff, 407o to defendant 
Terry R. West and 207o to defendant Flora E. West. 
The desired form of decree is set out in Paragraph 12 
of plaintiff's motion to amend (R. 75-79}. 
In the alternative, the plaintiff asks that the case 
be remanded for a new trial. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is the second appeal. The District Court 
originally had entered a summary judgment to the 
effect that all partnership capital and assets remaining 
after payment of non-partner creditors, were to be dis-
tributed 40<fo to plaintiff, 40lJo to defendant Terry R. 
West, and 20<fo to defendant Flora E. West. Appeal 
of that judgment was before this court as Case No. 
9870 and is reported as West v. West_, et al._, 15 Utah 
2d 87, 387 P .2d 686 ( 1964) . This court reversed, and 
remanded the case for trial, directing the court to "take 
evidence and make findings of fact as to what the intent 
of the parties was in executing" the Articles of Partner-
ship and a subsequent dissolution agreement. In its 
opinion this court pointed out that it would be proper 
to "consider the background and circumstances, includ-
ing the relationship of the parties, the purpose for which 
the various documents were made, and principles of 
equity and justice relating thereto." 
A trial was held, and the parties offered testimony 
and exhibits relating to the circumstances leading up 
to the execution of tlie partnership articles, subsequent 
conduct of the parties, and negotiations and transactions 
aimed at dissolution of the partnership. Produced as 
witnesses were Rulon R. West; Paul S. Roberts, the 
attorney who drew the partnership articles; defendant 
Terry R. West; two daughters of Rulon R. West and 
Flora E. West; two accountants, Kenneth A. Elwood 
and Paul D. Tanner; and a former attorney of Terry 
3 
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R. West, E. L. Schoenhals. Portions of the depositions 
of Flora E. West, and another West daughter, Ruth 
Francis, were heard. 
The trial court entered a "Minute Entry of De-
cision" dated April21, 1964 (R. 59-60), which set forth 
the "meaning" of the articles of partnership of October 
15, 1957 (Exhibit I) ; in it the trial court found that 
adjustment should be made to the books because of net 
profits and losses in various years; that the contribu-
tions made by Rulon R. West after December 3, 1958, 
were not contributed for "capital credit", and that they, 
like salary items, unpaid at the time due to Terry R. 
West and contributions of Flora E. West should have 
been kept separate, credited to a special account pay-
able, and returned to the respective partners with in-
terest. Substantially all of the remaining assets were 
to be distributed 40<fo to Rulon R. West, 407o to Terry 
R. West and 20<fo to Flora E. West. Thereafter find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law were prepared by 
defendants' counsel and were signed by the court. 
In this appeal the plaintiff challenges the suffi-
ciency of the findings of fact, contending that they are 
manifestly erroneous. Because of the nexus between 
the testimony and findings, summaries of relevant 
testimony and exhibits will be set out in the argument, 
particularly that part challenging the validity of the 
findings of fact. Other facts are set out in this court's 
prior opinion. 
4 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AS 
TO THE INTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
IN THE AR'fiCLES OF PARTNERSHIP AND 
DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT WERE MANI-
:FESTL Y ERRONEOUS. 
The findings of fact (R. 64-72) are difficult to 
analyze, because the court failed to find with respect 
to "actual intent," because the findings are repugnant 
to the Minute Entry of Decision, because they were 
drawn to take advantage of every conceivable theory 
supporting defendants' myriad positions, and because 
the findings apparently were drawn with one eye toward 
a future dispute with state and federal taxing authori-
ties. They did little more than restate the defendants' 
contentions as to the "meaning" of the Articles of 
Partnership. Finding No. 2 (R. 65), for example, is 
that the "intent of the parties in said Articles of Part-
nership was that the initial contributions made by the 
plaintiff would be contributions to capital," which intent 
"was expressed in the Articles of Partnership in para-
graph3(a)." The effect of such a finding is to ignore 
the parties' actual intentions and overrule the prior 
decision of this court that the articles are ambiguous. 
This objection is more than technical; upon the 
evidence presented, the only reasonable finding that 
could have been made with respect to "intention" was 
5 
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either ( 1) that Rulon intended to have his capital con-
tributions returned to him and the other parties knew 
this or should have known it; or (2) all parties so in-
tended, or ( 3) the evidence fails to establish actual 
intention of one or more of the parties. 
The following summary of trial evidence demon-
strates that the findings of intent are not supported by 
sufficient evidence and are manifestly erroneous. 
Paul 8. Roberts 
Mr .. Paul S. Roberts, the lawyer who drew the 
original Articles of Partnership in 1957, had repre-
sented the. sellers in their' sale of the motel property, 
and met Rulon while assisting in the transaction. Rulon 
asked Mr. Roberts to prepare Articles of Partnership, 
telling him that he. (Rulon) ought to have 57o interest 
on the money he put in the partnership, "about what 
he could get if he invested it someplace else" (R. 94). 
When Mr. Roberts inquired as to the "interests" of the 
partners, they agreed to make it 407o for Rulon, 407o 
for Terry, and 207o for Flora, but the discussion was 
in general terms. Return of capital was not discussed 
(R. 94-95). Mr. Roberts met with Rulon on only two 
or three occasions, and there was never a discussion 
with him about return of capital, the meaning of gross 
profits, or about any "gift." 
Contract provisions for dissolution and distribution 
of assets were taken from other agreements and form 
6 
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books, had not been discussed with Rulon, and were 
put in the agreement by Mr. Roberts (R. 98). He was 
not instructed to make distribution in any other pro-
portion; and he drew the agreement to provide that the 
distribution would be made in the same proportion as 
the profits would be distributed, since he regarded this 
as usual practice ( R. 99) . He did not discuss paragraph 
12 with Rulon West (R. 99), and the material in that 
paragraph came from his standard contracts (R. 100). 
He didn't read the clauses to Mr. West and he didn't 
talk to him about the phrase "including loss of capital" 
in paragraph 6 (R. 100). At the time of preparation 
of the agreement the drawing account was discussed 
between Rulon and Terry (R. 103), and it was agreed 
that the drawing account was to be $500.00 per month 
"provided that there was enough profits to pay that" 
(R. 104). He did not discuss with Rulon the provisions 
in paragraph 15 relating to dissolution and distribu-
tion of assets. All he did was draw the contract and 
submit it to the partners. 
Rulon R. West 
In October 1957 Rulon and Flora, his wife, were 
going on a trip. At that time Rulon was purchasing 
the motel property with the idea of going into a partner-
ship with Terry and he suggested that a written partner-
ship agreement be drawn up (R. 148). Rulon told 
Terry they would share 50-50 (R. 150), Rulon would 
get 5<fo on his money as interest, his capital would be 
repaid, and Terry's equity in the partnership would 
7 
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have to come out of the profits. Terry asked that I~,lora 
be brought into the partnership (R. 151). 
Rulon told Mr. Roberts that 5ro would have to be 
paid to him on his money, and that Terry would be 
permitted to buy an interest in the partnership with 
return to profits ( R. 152). Rulon left for Hawaii 
shortly after execution of the partnership agreement, 
and while he was in Hawaii Terry made his first request 
for additional money. Rulon did not send him money 
but gave him some immediately upon his return (R. 
153) .. At this time repayment of the money was not 
discussed (R. 154). Later at the trailer court Rulon 
requested payment of some interest (R. 155). 
On December 3, 1958, Rulon wrote a letter to Terry 
(Exhibit 9) enclosing for signature 27 promissory notes 
for the checks theretofore made out in behalf of the 
p~rtnership, totaling $124,823.43 (R. 156). On De-
cember 10, 1959, Rulon wrote a second letter to Terry 
asking for execution of notes ( R. 157, Exhibit 10). 
Throughout, Rulon believed that the money ad-
vanced to the partnership belonged to him, and that 
Terry and Flora would get their interest from profits 
(R. 161-162) .· He was expecting 57o interest on his 
money. He and Terry had agreed upon this and he told 
Mr. Roberts to put it in the agreement. He didn't know 
whether to call the money he paid in "investment," 
"contribution," or "loan" (R. 163). He didn't know 
how the amounts were credited (R. 168). 
8 
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Terry R. West 
About three years prior to the execution of the 
partnership agreement Rulon West had indicated in-
terest in owning a motel (R. 106}. About a year before 
execution of the Articles, Rulon had had a nervous 
breakdown (R. 113). Before execution of the partner-
ship agreement there had been a meeting between Rulon 
and Terry, alone, at a Chinese cafe in Murray. Rulon 
said that any further sums he contributed would be 
credited to Rulon's capital account, and Terry was 
agreeable to this because "it was his money anyway" 
(R. 110). In his initial testimony, Terry had difficulty 
in answering whether repayment of capital was dis-
cussed, but finally said it had been, and that Rulon said 
in terms, that "the capital I put in will not need to 
be repaid" (R. 111). But his subsequent testimony 
shows this is be little more than an audacious conclusion 
from statements that were non-specific. 
"He told me of course, that he was getting 65 
years old; that he was considerably - conserva-
tively figured - worth half a million dollars, 
and that he and his attorneys - he didn't say 
who -he and his attorneys had had - discussed 
his other plan, and that he would like to have, in 
the partnership agreement, a statement that 
where, upon his death, that, automatically, I 
would be distributed part of his capital; and I 
told him, 'I wasn't so worried about what would 
happen upon your death as how worried I am as, 
after I changed my future plans in accounting 
and engineering, if I come out here, and, for 
one reason or another, this thing is a flop.' He 
9 
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says, 'This is no problem because we can have 
another arrangement in t.he pa~tnership agree-
ment, whereby, upon a dissolution, you will be 
protected there, too.' 
"Q. Is that the extent of his undertaking at 
that time? 
:'A. I wouldn~t say it was word for word, but 
thzs was about what was said between myself and 
my father_, yes. 
"Q. That is what you rely on that as separate 
oral · understanding as the basis for the transfer 
on the books? 
"A. I rely that, upon why the provision was 
placed into the partnership, paragraph 12, which 
ca,rries down * * * Indirectly, yes; I relied upon 
that." (R. 132-133). 
Later Terry testified to substantially the same 
thing again : 
"Dad told me that he was getting toward 65 
or 70 years old -. along in years. I don't know 
the exact age, he used the words, 'getting along 
in years.' ·He has been doing some estate banking, 
and that he thought he should have provision in 
that partnership whereby upon his death there 
would be an automatic distribution ·to me of part 
of his capital contribution. # 
"I told him, as well a·s I can remember, maybe 
not word-for-word, that I was not so worried 
about wh~t w~uld happen if he died, as I was 1!-ot 
.expecting him to drop dead, but I was worried 
· 'what would happen after I quit school, and 
changed my future plans, and when out to Mur-
10 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ray in a partnership, if for o~e reason or another, 
it went belly-up, and was dissolved. 
"He said, 'this was no problem. We can have 
provisions in the partnership that will take care 
of this also.' 
"Q. That is the conversation upon which you 
rely~ as speaking that intent. 
"A. That intent for drawing the original 
partnership~ yes. 
"Q. As I understand, when the original part-
nership articles were drawn, Mr. Wunderli 
(should be Mr. Roberts), also your father, had 
never said anything to you to indicate he did not 
intend to get his money out. 
"A. We never discussed it. 
"Q. Never came up, or been a statement to 
you of that kind, in that three-year period? 
"A. No sir." (R. 320.) (Emphasis added.) 
During the discussion of the partnership agreement 
Rulon stated that he wanted 5lfo back before distribu .. 
tion of any profit on a 40-40-20 basis ( R. 112) . Return 
of capital to Rulon, or to any of the partners, was 
never discussed with either Mr. Roberts, who drew the 
agreement, or with Flora, the third partner ( R. 113) . 
At the time of signing the articles, Terry went out of 
the room with Flora and explained the benefits of the 
contract to her, but he did not tell her she had a right 
to share in Rulon's capital (R. 115). 
Terry had a degree in accounting, and he managed 
the partnership and kept all the books (R. 115). When 
11 
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'ferry needed money for the partnership business he 
asked for it (R. 116), but he was careful never to ask 
for money for operations. He says that his father never 
mentioned notes (R. 117). When Terry obtained money 
from Flora, on the other hand, it was by way of loans 
which were paid back at 8 per cent interest (R. 119). 
Terry, in setting up the books, understood that capital 
accounts were meant to reflect "the monetary interest 
a partner has in the business as of that day" (R. 120). 
Prior to dissolution· of the partnership Terry didn't 
regard ·himself as having any substantial monetary in-
terest ( R. 120) except for about $1,000.00 paid in and 
a credit he had made to his own capital account (R. 
121). It was his practice to credit his salary to capital 
if there were not enough profits to pay it, and he did 
this without prior consultation with his partners (R. 
121). 
. As of the date the notice of dissolution was sent, 
March 21, 1960, substantially all sums paid by Rulon 
West to the partnership had been credited to Rulon's 
capital account ( R. 128) , and it was not until June 15, 
1960, that Terry made an entry transferring 60Cfo to 
him and Flora (R. 129}. He refused to elect any 
particular written or oral agreement as the basis for 
his claimed right, taking the position that it came from 
numerous conversations and writings over a period of 
three or four years (R. 132-133). 
12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II 
Flora E. West 
Defendartt Flora E. West did not appear at the 
trial, and portions of her deposition were read into the 
record. She testified that the first thing she knew about 
the partnership was when she was taken to Mr. Roberts' 
office (R. 17 4-176). She signed the agreement after 
reading it over and over ( R. 17 4-17 5) . She didn't dis-
cuss the provisions with Mr. Roberts, and there had 
been no prior discussion of the terms with anyone. Her 
understanding that she was to receive 207o of Rulon's 
capital was based solely upon her interpretation of the 
agreement (R. 180-181), because "where would I get 
it?" (R. 181). No one obtained permission from her 
to make additional investments in the partnership (R. 
181). She hadn't thought much about distribution of 
assets, but only about losses (R. 182). Rulon had never 
told her that she and Terry were to get 607o of his 
capital. He didn't talk to her about the partnership 
(R. 183}. She didn't believe Rulon "gave contribu-
tions," but that he "put that investment in there" ( R. 
179). Rulon told her he intended to put "all my income 
from now on out" into the venture, and did-n't hope to 
see a dime of it while he was living ( R. 180) . 
Donna Holmes 
Donna Holmes is a daughter of Rulon and Flora 
West. During the winter of 1959 Flora told her Rulon 
wasn't losing anything in the motel venture because 
his money was drawing interest, which was to come out 
13 
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before any profits (R. 184-185). At a family meeting 
in February, 1960, attended by Terry, Rulon and some 
of Rulon's daughters, the daughters were told that it 
was to be understood that 'the motel was Dad's", that 
the profit and loss was being divided 40-40-20, and that 
Terry was "building the estate" of Rulon. Terry said 
he had $3,000.00 in the venture, to which Rulon stated 
that he thought it was only $1,500.00 (R. 186). 
Betty Bills 
Betty Bills, another daughter, was also at the 
family meeting of February, 1960. At this meeting 
Terry said all he had was a job and a right to 40<;'o of 
the profit and loss; and that he was building his Dad's 
estate ( R. 189) . 
Ruth Francis 
Ruth Francis, another daughter (called by de-
fendants) testified that Rulon told her in April, 1960, 
that he and Terry had reached a settlement, and that 
Rulon had then given Terry part of his inheritance 
(R. 209-210), but that Terry was to buy Rulon out 
(R. 257-258). 
LeRoy E. Holmes 
Le Roy E. Holmes, a son-in-law of Rulon and 
Flora, testified that during the winter of 1959, Flora 
West had told him that all the money Rulon put into 
the partnership would be returned to him before she 
would. receive anything substantial (R. 251). 
14 
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The testimony of all three partners and the scrivener, 
establishes that there was never any discussion with 
respect to Rulon's giving up the right to return of 
capital. Terry's entire case depends upon conversion 
of a general statement that he could be "protected" 
into an agreement that he would receive 407o of Rulon's 
capital regardless of whenever, however, and in what 
amounts the contributions might thereafter be made. 
The evidence does not support the view that Terry 
and Flora believed what they now claim to have be-
lieved. The conduct of all three partners supports th~ 
construction claimed by Rulon. 
Take Rulon's conduct when he talked to Mr. 
Roberts. He told him that he wanted 57o return on 
his money, which was about what he could get if he 
"invested" it someplace else. Thereafter, on December 
3, 1958 (as the trial court must have believed) Rulon 
wrote to Terry that he wanted notes made up for 
amounts previously advanced at Terry's request. In 
a subsequent transaction with the First Security Bank 
aimed at obtaining some additional financing, Terry 
and Rulon both being present, Rulon submitted a finan-
cial statement showing the motel, El Rancho Enter-
prises, to be his asset, of a valueof $135,000.00 (R. 
251-252; Exhibit 13). During this same time, which 
was subsequent to the letter of December 3, 1958, the 
partnership agreement was re-executed with the dis-
tribution of assets provision unchanged ( R. 303) . 
Terry's conduct, on the other hand, is inconsistent 
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with a present claim of ownership. He kept the books 
of the partnership in which amounts contributed to 
capital by him and his partners was credited to their 
respective capital accounts, with knowledge that capital 
accounts reflect the "monetary interests" of the various 
partners (R. 120). His own financial statement for the 
First Security Bank (Exhibit 12) did not show as an 
asset any interest in El Rancho Enterprises. He con-
tinually asked his father for money for use in the part-
nership (R. 116) but between its inception in 1957 and 
April2, 1960, neither he nor Rulon ever mentioned that 
the capital paid in by Rulon was not to be returned 
( R. 320) . Notwithstanding dissolution of the partner-
ship on about March 21, 1960, the event upon which 
Terry says his interest was to vest, -~e took no steps 
to make a transfer on the books of the partnership 
until June 15, 1960, after Rulon had left the country 
(R. 184). Terry admitted making the statements at a 
family meeting as related by his sisters, but explained 
that he was only telling them "what I considered as 
of that date my position in the El Rancho Enterprises 
was" (R. 278). He admits that he told his sisters that 
he had $2,000.00 to $3,000.00 and Rulon had $140,-
000.00 in the capital accounts. He also testified at one 
point in the trial that he did recall telling his sisters 
that all he had at El Rancho "was a job and 40% 
interest in the profits" which was true at the time, that 
is, in February 1960 (R. 135-136). After a night's 
sleep, he changed his testimony (R. 278}. 
Flora's only basis for an understanding about the 
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meaning of the articles when she signed them was the 
articles themselves. Her conduct thereafter indicates 
that she did not believe that she had a right, present or 
contingent, to receive Rulon's capital or any part of 
it. It was her understanding that the "gift" made by 
Rulon to Terry was made at Murray during the meeting 
of April 2, 1960-not that she had always had a right 
to a share of Rulon's capital account (R. 176). 
The 1960 talk between the parties about gifts, 
sharing capital accounts, and the desire of Rulon to 
make some provision for distribution of his estate, all 
occurred at about the time the parties were attempting 
to settle their differences. Almost three years had passed 
since the articles of partnership were entered into, and 
although those negotiations might have a bearing upon 
the interpretation and effect of the agreements of March 
and April, 1960, their bearing upon what the parties 
meant in September and October, 1957, is not discern-
able-except insofar as they seemed to be negotiating 
about something Rulon owned. 
Moreover, Terry's testimony was sprinkled with 
half truths, inconsistencies and revisions throughout. 
The statements he made at the family meeting are 
clearly inconsistent with the position he takes now. In 
his first-day testimony Terry swore that Rulon "in 
terms" had said his capital would not have to be returned. 
In later testimony he twice admits the scope of the dis-
cussion to have been that he could be "protected" in 
event of dissolution. At the trial he swore that during 
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discussions of the dissolution agreement he told Earl 
Wunderli that there were "no liabilities to partners"; 
whereas in his deposition, in response to a direct question 
about such a discussion he had said only that "they had 
access to the books." Confronted with the inconsistency, 
he said, with reference to such a discussion, "I didn't 
say one way or the other, did I?" At the trial he swore 
that the supplemental "gift" agreement was meant 
to have operative effect, but on his deposition he had 
sworn that it was obtained only for tax purposes. When 
confronted with his deposition he swore that the "main 
reason" was for tax purposes (R. 308-309). 
As this court indicated in Wood v. Wood et al., 
87 Utah 394, 49 P.2d 416, 422, a court may in evaluat-
ing the testimony of the parties, consider "natural 
behavior". 
It is not natural behavior for a person to demand 
5lfo interest on money while giving up return of the 
principal. It is not natural for persons claiming sub-
stantial ownership of a partnership to conduct their 
affairs as if they had no ownership. It is not natural 
behavior for a son, when queri~d by his sisters about 
being favored by his parent, to say all he has is a job 
and an interest in 407o of the profits, when he in fact 
claims an absolute right to receive 407o of his father's 
capital. 
Under the provisions of 48-1-15 Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, contributions of partners are to be returned 
to them, "subject to any agreement." It is submitted 
18 
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that a partner who wants to avoid the effects of 48-1-15 
bas the burden of showing an agreement that capital 
shall not be returned. In the articles in this case, it may 
be arguable that the $48,500.00 was being "donated" 
to the partnership-and such a donation would be con-
sistent with Terry's idea that he could be protected. 
But subsequent contributions, according to paragraph 
3 (b), are to be credited to the capital account of the 
contributing partner. On the previous appeal this court 
said that the contract was ambiguous with respect to 
return of capital. The defendants have failed to produce 
evidence of any circumstances or actual intent which 
would show an agreement specific enough to overcome 
the effect of 48-1-15. 
Insofar as the findings fail to state what the actual 
intent was, they fail to follow this court's prior directive; 
and if they are construed as finding an actual intent 
that Rulon's subsequent contributions need not be re-
turned, they lack evidential support, and the judgment 
should be reversed. 
II 
THE COURT'S FINDING AND CONCLU-
SION THAT THE DISSOLUTION AGREE-
MENT OF MARCH 31, 1960, WAS VALID AND 
BINDING WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUF-
FICIENT EVIDENCE AND WAS ERRONE-
OUS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
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In its decision ( R. 59-60) the trial court found 
that the articles were "binding upon the parties" and 
that the "intention of the parties to the articles as to 
the meaning of the articles" required adjustments as 
set out in the decision. r.rhere was no reference to the 
dissolution agreement of March 3I, I960 (Exhibit 2). 
Between the dates of the minute entry and preparation 
of the findings and conclusions the dissolution agree-
ment became an operative document. 
Iri Finding of Fact ~o. 8 (R. 70) the court found 
that the parties in executing the dissolution agreement 
of March 3I, I960, did not intend that "liabilities to 
partners'' should include the capital accounts of the 
parties, nor did they intend that the phrase "liabilities 
of the partnership" should include capital accounts of 
the parties. There was no finding as to what they did 
intend . 
. And in Conclusions of LawN o. I (R. 7I) the court 
held that all the parties were ''bound'' by the dissolution 
agreement. 
The court refused to find that the "supplemental 
agreement" (Exhibit I6) (found by this court insuffi-
cient to constitute a gift) had operative effect, taking 
the pqsition that it was unenforceable for lack of con-
sideration. The express negative finding is not included 
in the formal findings of fact, but may be implicit in 
the fact that it is not mentioned in Conclusion of Law 
No. I. 
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The enforceability of the dissolution agreement 
should be considered in the light of paragraph 16 of the 
Articles of Partnership: 
"Any decisions and major arrangements re-
quired or necessary in the operation of said busi ... 
ness which are not in the ordinary course of 
operations shall only be made and effected by 
and with the unanimous agreement and consent 
of all the partners." 
The dissolution agreement is not "in the ordinary 
course of operations" of the partnership, since it pro-
vides for dissolution, the selling of all partnership 
property, and distribution of assets. It also in para-
graph 2 contains provisions as to management of the 
business pending winding up, and for participation of 
an outside person, Le Roy E. Holmes, as sometime 
agent of Rulon R. West. 
Although the parties are in conflict as to the 
meaning of the dissolution agreement, there is no sub-
stantial dispute as to the manner in which, and the times 
at which, it was signed. 
Terry testified· that the dissolution agreement was 
a result of negotiations after a dispute (R. 122) . The 
agreement hadn't been discussed with Flora E. West, 
and she didn't see it or sign it until long after it was 
signed by Rulon and Terry, at a time when Terry and 
Rulon had found that they could not resolve their differ-
ences (R. 124). E. L. Schoenhals, who assisted in 
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negotiation of the dissolution agreement, swore that he 
had not discussed the matter with Flora (R. 340). 
In written interrogatories served upon the defend-
ant Flora West on June 14, 1961, and introduced at 
the trial, the following question and answer are set 
out: 
"Q. If you signed, on what date or dates did 
you sign a~reements (~earing date of April 2, 
1960) relating to the dissolution of the partner-
ship and distribution of assets? Where? Who 
was present? 
"A. Not sure, probably January, 1961, prob-
ably at my home in the presence of Terry West" 
(R. 254). 
It is thus clear that the dissolution agreement was 
negotiated between Terry West and Rulon West with-
out the concurrence or consent of one of the partners. 
The agreement affected her rights, and could not bind 
her unless she agreed to it. Inasmuch as the agreement 
is not necessarily "beneficial" to her (if she really 
believed herself already entitled to 207o of Rulon's 
capital), her assent cannot be presumed. There is no 
evidence that she ever agreed orally to the terms of the 
dissolution agreement before she signed it. 
By the time she signed, any offer by Rulon to her 
to contract on such a basis would have expired. Not 
only had a reasonable time elapsed, but circumstances 
must have revoked the offer. When Flora signed it in 
January, 1961, in the presence of Terry West, a dispute 
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had developed between him and his father that could 
not be resolved. The records of this case show that the 
complaint was filed by Rulon West with the clerk of 
the District Court on January 6, 1961, and it is fair 
to infer that the agreement was not executed by Flora 
West until after this action had been brought, and 
that it was signed for the purpose of attempting to 
obtain some advantage in the action. If Terry and Flora 
rely upon the dissolution agreement, it is their obligation 
to show that the elements of a valid contract, viz., offer, 
acceptance, and consideration; and, the acceptance of 
the offer must have been made while the offer was still 
open. 
The evidence establishes that the parties contem-
plated a written dissolution agreement. The situation 
with respect to which they were contracting was one 
in which a writing would be desired. The contract had 
been drawn by the attorneys for Terry and Rulon and 
set out a detailed plan of dissolution. In light of the 
parties' prior disputes and problems, the only reason-
able inference is that none was to be bound until the 
dissolution agreement had been executed by all. As 
said in Spinney v. Downing~ 108 Cal. 666, 41 Pac. 797: 
II 
"When it is a part of the understanding be-
tween the parties that the terms of their compact 
are to be reduced to writing, and signed by the 
parties, the assent to its terms must be evidenced 
in the manner agreed upon, or it does not become 
a binding obligation on either." 
See also, I Corbin on Contracts_, §80, p. 104 et seq.; 
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1 Williston on Contracts (3rd Ed.) §28A; Hopkins v. 
Paradise Heights Fruit Growers" Assn._, 58 Mont. 404 
' 193 Pac. 389. 
There was no finding with respect to intention to 
be bound; but there is no evidence that Flora assented 
to the dissolution agreement at or about the time it was 
signed by Terry and Rulon. 'This being true, the disso-
lution agreement as signed by two of the partners is, 
with respect to the third, only an offer to contract-
which could he accepted prior to its revocation, reject-
tion, or expiration. 
The offer was made ..,on or about April 2, 1960. 
There is no evidence of any accepatnce by (indeed, 
any communication to) Flora before January, 1961. 
If no time is specified in the offer, it terminates after a 
reasonable time; and what is reasonable depends in 
part upon "circumstances of the case which the offeree 
at the time of his acceptance either knows or has reason 
to know." Restatement of Contracts_, §40; 1 Corbin on 
Contracts_, §36; 1 Williston on Contracts (3rd Ed.) §54. 
Flora no longer had power to "accept" the offer by 
signing Terry's carbon copy of the Dissolution Agree-
ment (Exhibit 2). Nine months had passed, and Rulon 
had brought an action against Terry and Flora for 
dissolution and winding up of partnership affairs. She 
must have known that all bets were off. 
The Dissolution Agreement purports to be an 
executory contract, and the provisions for distribution 
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of assets to the various partners are conditional upon 
Terry West taking steps to operate the properties for 
the partners, sell the property and wind up partnership 
affairs. The obligation to wind up and sell, so that 
partnership property could be converted into a dis-
tributable assets, appears to be an essential part of the 
agreement. 
The agreement was signed by Rulon West on 
March 31, 1960, and by Terry West, apparently a day 
or two later. Yet the voluntary winding up of the 
partnership affairs never occurred. As of January 6, 
1961, when this action was initiated, the business was 
being operated by Terry much as before, and no sale 
of any substantial part of the partnership assets had 
been made. Moreover, the findings of fact of the 
special master, confirmed by the court (R. 34, 48), 
establish that beginning in late March, 1960, and until 
October 25, 1961, the defendants Terry West and Flora 
West used a portion of the partnership property for 
their own business; that they made a profit on it, and 
that Rulon had to have court assistance to obtain his 
rightful share. 
Not only that, but Terry never did sell the partner-
ship property and wind up partnership affairs. On 
October 25, 1961, the District Court, after a hearing, 
found that it was necessary to appoint a receiver to 
do so (R. 29-32). The order appointing the receiver 
was entered more than a year and a half after Rulon 
and Terry had signed the dissolution agreement. 
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Because of the defend&nts' nonperformance, there 
was a failure of consideration, and Rulon's obligations 
under the Dissolution Agreement were excused. Re-
statement of Contracts_, §274; 3A Corbin on Contracts 
J 
§658; 6 Williston on Contracts (3rd Ed.), §814. 
III 
THE COURT'S FINDING THAT AMOUNTS 
AWARDED TO DEFENDANTS WERE "BY 
WAY OF GIFT" WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND WAS ERRO-
NEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
"*** a promise, unsupported by a valid con-
sideration, to make a gift does not constitute a 
gift; nor can such a promise be enforced, even 
though the promise be made in writing, and the 
writing delivered to and accepted by the donee. 
*** 
"A gift inter vivos to be valid must take effect 
at once, and there must be nothing to be done 
essential to the validity; for if it is to take effect 
in the future, there is no gift, but only a promise 
to give. So a gift to take effect at the death of the 
donor is void ***" Thornton_, Gifts and Ad-
vancements (1893), §§ 74 and 76. 
Until the findings were entered in the instant case, 
the above statement from a venerated writer had been 
almost unanimously accepted for decades as a correct 
state1nent of the law. If Thornton is right, the finding 
of "gift" must be set aside, even on the testimony of 
the defendants themselves. 
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In the following excerpt Terry West is being 
questioned by Rulon's counsel, using Terry's prior 
deposition: 
" 'Q. Now I show you Exhibit 3 (the Sup-
plemental Agreement; Exhibit 16 in the present 
appeal), Mr. West. You can read that over. It is 
not signed, as you will see, and it is not dated; 
however, is that substantially the agreement you 
were telling us about? *** It was your under-
standing, was it, that this agreement was part of 
this Exhibit 2?' (Exhibit 2 being the Dissolution 
Agreement) 
'A. Yes.*** 
'Q. (reading from deposition) 'Why were 
you so concerned about this gift business ; you 
already owned it, didn't you? *** Your answer 
then was this: 'A. The gift business, as far as 
this Exhibit No. 3, was strictly to prevent Uncle 
Sam from coming in for any taxes. As far as the 
gift, it was already made and signed by my father 
with Exhibit No. 2 and the original partnership.' 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. You would like to change your answer 
to my next question, would you, earlier in the 
examination today? 
"A. What was the question? 
"Q. I said to you the sole purpose of this 
Supplemental Agreement was to meet an anti-
cipated tax liability? 
"A. I said no, partially. I couldn't answer 
exactly one way or the other to that question. 
The biggest reason I had that drawn was for tax 
purposes, but that was not the only reason. 
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''Q. What was the other reason? 
"A. So we knew exactly what was happening 
out there, and supported the other three docu-
ments. 
"Q. Now going to our examination at that 
time, I asked you this question, do you recall: 
(page 40, line 22) 'Q. You figured that a gift 
was made by your father at the time he signed 
the original partnership?' *** Your answer to 
that was: 'A. No. The gift was promised if the 
business was ever sold at the time of the original 
partnership. And then when he made these other 
documents, he verified that intent. And as far 
as this, Exhibit No. 3 was signed just strictly for 
income tax purposes.' *** 
"Q. The next question was: 'Q. So your un-
derstanding at the time of the partnership agree-
ment itself was that there was not any gift then, 
but there (page 41) was a promise to make a 
gift?' 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And your answer: 'A. If the partner-
ship was ever sold.' 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And is that still your testimony? 
"A. That is still my testimonyn (R. 307· 
309) . (Emphasis added.) 
Flora's testimony at the trial is more skimpy than 
Terry's, but of the same purport. She stated (R. 180) 
that whether she received 207o depended upon the sale 
of the motel. This is consistent with the averment in 
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her answer to the complaint, filed early in the case. Her 
third defense (R. 24) is as follows: 
"On October 15_, 1957_, by the aforesaid part-
nership agreement, plaintiff made a gift to this 
defendant of 20% of all of the contributions 
made to said partnership by him_, whether at its 
inception or thereafter and whether by ~ay of 
capital contributions or by way of advances to 
the partnership, and this defendant in acceptance 
of. said gift materially altered and changed her 
position and plaintiff is estopped and should not 
now be heard to say that said gift is or can be 
withdrawn, altered or modified." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Her position as well as Terry's, then, is that Rulon 
made a gift not only of $48,500.00, which he contributed 
to the partnership at the time the articles of partnership 
were drawn, but at that same time he made or promised 
a gift of all future contributions, no matter how much 
they might be. 
The theory of the trial court appeared to be that 
the articles of October 15, 1957, constituted a gift of 
the original contribution, and a promise to make a gift 
of future contribution. The court seemed to think an 
intention to make a gift was expressed in the partner-
ship articles, from which he could presume a like intent 
every time Terry requested and obtained money from 
Rulon, regardless of the circumstances under which the 
request was made. 
There is no basis for such a presumption-particu-
larly in light of the evidence of "intent" outlined above, 
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and even if there were, the other essential elements 
of an inter vivos gift have not been proved. 'fhe sutns 
paid in by Rulon were not paid to the partners, but 
were placed in Rulon's capital account, and continued 
to be subject to some control by Rulon. There was no 
assignment of a partnership interest as such. There was 
no delivery of property to the claimed donees at any 
time. The interest held by the partnership is not held 
by the partners as such. Under the Utah Partnership 
Act, a partner retains an interest in partnership prop-
erty as a tenant in partnership, which interest is com-
pletely inconsistent with a completed inter vivos gift 
of property. As said in JVood v. Wood et al.J 87 Utah 
394, 49 P.2d 416, 418: 
"Gifts inter vivos have no reference to the 
future, and go into immediate and absolute effect, 
and a gift of property to take effect at some 
future date, or at the death of the donor is void. 
Such a transaction amounts only to a promise 
to make a gift in the future, and, being without 
consideration, cannot be enforced." 
A case nearly in point is Meyer v. Meyer, 
106 Miss. 638, 64 So. 420, in which three sons 
claimed that their father had given them a half interest 
in his share of a partnership, by way of gift. The court 
held that the father had not made a gift of the share, 
but only an ineffectual promise to make a gift. In 
commenting on the claim of the sons that a gift had 
been made, the court said: 
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"These sons of Jacob Meyer were each em-
ployes of the firm receiving salaries as such, and 
this credit to them of a portion of their father's 
interest in the profits of the business was not as 
compensation for any services rendered. These 
sons seem to have drawn each year out of the 
business something more than the salaries paid 
them though the amounts drawn in excess of 
their salaries constituted only a small portion of 
the profits credited to them. It does not appear 
that they were authorized to withdraw the profits 
credited to them, without the consent of the 
members of the fir1n, nor does it appear that 
either member had authority to withdraw profits 
therefrom without the consent of the other. It is 
hardly conceivable that the members of this firm 
intended that their sons and daughters should 
withdraw therefrom the profits credited to them, 
for it is perfectly obvious that had they so done 
the business would have been seriously crippled; 
and, moreover, the amounts credited to them 
were merely estimated and not ascertained 
profits. 
"These facts evidenced nothing more than a 
promise on the part of Meyer to give to his sons 
a portion of his interest in the profits of the busi-
ness, which promise he never complied with by 
withdrawing these profits from the business and 
delivering them to his sons; consequently they 
never became the owners thereof and their claim 
thereto should not have been allowed." 
The court held the gift ineffectual, notwithstanding 
amounts had been credited to the sons-at the direction 
of the father-on the partnership books. 
The essential elements of gift include: (I) com-
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petent donor, (2) freedom of will of the donor, (3) 
completion of the gift with nothing left undone, ( 4) 
delivery of property by the donor and acceptance by 
the donee, and ( 5) the gift must go into immediate and 
absolute effect. Applying these requirements in Goggins 
et al.~ v. Herndon/~ 73 Idaho 169, 249 P.2d 203, the 
Idaho Supreme Court struck down a claimed gift, not-
withstanding a document had been signed by the claimed 
donor to the effect that the proceeds of any sale of 
mining claims were to be "divided and shared equally 
between the above named parties." The court held that 
the agreement lacked three of the elements: That it be 
complete and nothing left undone, that it be delivered 
by the donee and accepted by the donee, and that it 
go into immediate and absolute effect. In the present 
case the claimed donees both admit that they were to 
have a gift only if the business was sold. 
The elements of gift must all be proved by clear 
and convincing evidence. Lovett v. The Continental 
Bank and Trust Company~ 4 Utah 2d 76, 286 P.2d 
1065; and "unless the intention to make a gift is ex-
pressed in writing or is clearly inferrable from the acts 
or declarations of the alleged donor, there must always 
be grave doubt" whether the transaction shall be con-
sidered a gift. Holman v. Deseret Savings BankJ 41 
Utah 340, 124 Pac. 765. 
Courts have sometimes found a presumption of 
gift where property has been delivered by a parent 
to a child, but there is no basis for such a finding where 
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the property is delivered to the child in his capacity 
as the manager of a partnership business, for use in 
that business. It makes a difference that Terry occupied 
a fiduciary position. As said by this court in Sharp v. 
Sharp) 54 Utah 262, 180 Pac. 580: 
"The relation of partners as between them-
selves is a fiduciary one, that of trustee and cestui 
que trust." 
Or, as said in Nelson v. MatschJ 38 Utah 122, 110 
Pac. 865: 
"One of the fundamental principles of the law 
of partnership is that partners stand in a fidu-
ciary relation to each other, and that it is the 
duty of each partner to observe the utmost good 
faith toward his co-partners in all dealings and 
transactions that come within the scope of the 
partnership business.'' 
Where such a fiduciary relationship exists there is a 
presumption that a transfer from a father to a son, 
in the context of a business relationship, is not a gift. 
Ratliff v. Ratliff) 283 l{y. 418, 141 S.W. 2d 
566, involved a claimed gift from father to son. The 
father had been a successful businessman. He loaned 
the son $1,200.00 for which the son gave a note, which 
the father lost. The son and a witness testified that when 
they went to pay off the note to the father, the father 
gave the son a receipt signed by the father and refused 
to take the money, "which amounted to a gift inter 
vivos." The court refused to recognize the receipt as 
delivery of a gift of a debt, saying: 
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"Gifts inte_r vivos are closely scrutinized by 
courts, especially where the donor and donee 
occupy c_on~denti~l relations and it takes clear 
an? convi~cin~ evidence to sustain them; *** The 
evidence In this record is neither clear nor con-
vincing that William Ratcliffe made a gift to his 
son, Albert, of the balance due on this note by the 
alleged e?'~cution of the receipt of August 30, 
1932, reciting $1,200.00 was received from him 
'for note in full.' There is nothing to connect 
the note sued on with the note mentioned in the 
receipt." 
A related case is Gish v. St. Joseph Loan & Trust 
Co.~ 66 Ind. App. 500, 113 N.E. 394. There the de-
fendant-appellant was "a practicing physician and a 
shrewd businessman of learning and ability * * * his 
father believed him to be honest, and relied upon and 
confided in him in the transaction of his business." The 
son, acting as his father's manager in relation to certain 
of his father's property, obtained substantial amounts 
of property from his father. Before the father died, 
he discovered that his son had managed the affairs of 
his property in such a way that the son had obtained 
substantial property from the father. The father 
brought suit for the return of the property, but the son 
refused, relying upon certain notes and instruments 
which the father had signed. The court held that the 
transfers to the son were invalid, saying: 
"The burden is on the one who holds such 
superior position to prove that he acted in per· 
f ect good faith, gave to the other party full and 
accurate information possessed by him, took no 
34 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
advantage of his knowledge, or his influence over 
the other party, and that the transaction involved 
was fair, well understood, and voluntarily carried 
out by the person to whom he owed such duty. 
*** ~less positive and unequivocal proof is re-
quired to establish the delivery of a gift from 
parent to child than as between persons not so 
related, and in cases where there is no suggestion 
of fraud or undue influence very slight evidence 
will suffice; but that rule does not apply to a 
case where the child stands in a fiduciary relation 
to the parent~ and htU access to and control over 
his property.~***" (Emphasis added). 
In Baer v. Baer, 109 Colo. 545, 12·8 P.2d 478, a 
transfer from the mother to her son, alleged to have 
been a gift, was held to be a loan. The son was his 
mother's advisor in regard to some of her business 
affairs. It was held that he had the burden of proving 
that the transfer was a gift, the presumption being 
it was not. 
Terry's unconscionable behavior as a fiduciary con-
sisted in asking his father for additional money for use 
in partnership business, without disclosing that he in-
tended to claim part ownership of the moneys obtained. 
Rulon had a legal right to Terry's information-includ-
ing his construction of the partnership articles. Cf. 
Callister v. Callister) 15 Utah 2d 380, 393 P.2d 477; 
see also, Normand v. Normand~ 89 Vt. 77, 94 Atl. 172; 
Nobles v. Hutton~ 7 Cal. App. 14, 93 Pac. 289; 
Naeseth v. Hommedal~ 109 Minn. 153. 123 N.W. 
287; Barnard v. Gantz~ 140 N.Y. 249, 35 N.E. 430; 
Morgan v. Owens~ 228 Ill. 598, 81 N.E. 1135; Com-
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stock v. Comstock~ 57 Barber (N.Y.) 458; Weitz v. 
Moulden~ 109 Okl. 119, 234 Pac. 583; and Thaw v. 
Thaw~ 27 F.2d 729, in which the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit required of the fiduciary-donee 
"candor and communication," and the "fairest and full-
est explanation" to and with the persons so trusting. 
Other cases dealing with the elements of gifts, 
including the requisite delivery, are Johnson et al. v. 
Hilliard, 113 Colo. 548, 160 P.2d 386; In re Hall's Es-
tate~ 154 Cal. 527, 98 Pac. 269; Gardner v. Moore's 
A.dm~r.~ 122 Va. 10, 94 S.E. 162; Gammon Theological 
Seminary v. Robbins et al.~ 128 Ind. 85, 27 N.E. 341; 
Banner Window Glass Co. v. Barriat et al.~ 85 W.Va. 
750, 102 S.E. 726; Steber v. Combs et al.~ 121 W. Va. 
509, 5. S.E. 2d 420. 
_ A gift of the initial $48,500.00 paid into the part-
nership by Rulon West does not create as great a 
difficulty because there was a delivery of property to 
the partnership, and a writing relating to it, prior to 
the time the fiduciary relationship came into existence. 
But with respect to amounts of money subsequently 
advanced to the partnership, there is no evidence at 
all of any particular intent on the part of Rulon West 
at the time of each advance; moreover, the evidence is 
that Terry did not deal with his father with candor, 
or give him a full explanation when additional funds 
were requested. 
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IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT. 
The findings of fact as signed by the court violated 
the direction of this court on the prior appeal that it 
should take evidence ad make findings as to the intent 
of the parties in executing the articles of partnership 
and the dissolution agreement. The findings also vio-
lated the dictates of Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, that the court shall find the facts specially. 
The judgment ignored the existing provisions of an-
other judgment entered on February 27, 1963, and 
left it up to the receiver, or the court on the basis of 
a future motion, to determine the effect of the findings 
of fact, and the two judgments. 
The manner in which the findings was drawn makes 
it impossible to determine the court's theory in ordering 
distribution in the way it did. It is impossible to tell 
whether the findings were based upon the ''actual in-
tent" of the parties, or a lack of evidence as to intent, 
or upon a construction of the partnership articles. His 
"findings of fact" are essentially conclusions as to 
the construction to be placed upon the partnership 
agreement. 
The findings in this case are in such vague and 
general terms that they do not meet the requirements 
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previously laid down by this court. See Gaddis Invest-
ment Co. v. Morrison_, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278 P.2d 284 
' to the effect that "the failure of the trial court to make 
findings of fact on all rna terial issues is reversible error 
where it is prejudicial." In the present case there were 
material issues with respect to the actual intentions of 
the parties in executing the articles of partnership and 
the dissolution agreement; also, as to when, where and 
how a gift was made. The finding that the amounts 
being distributed to Terry and Flora were "by way of 
gift" is totally inadequate to apprise either the plaintiff 
or this court of the basis of the trial court's ruling. 
In paragraph 3 of the plaintiff's motion to amend 
the findings of fact there is a challenge to the finding 
that Terry was entitled to salary that he was not able 
to take because of the unavailability of funds (R. 77). 
The finding allowing unpaid salary to Terry should 
have been vacated on the ground that the partnership 
agreement does not allow a credit if funds are not 
sufficient to pay the salary. Paragraph 5 of the Articles 
of Partnership contain the following provision: 
"The said Terry R. West shall be Jhe manager 
of the partnership business and shall be entitled 
to draw up to but not exceeding the sum ~~ 
$500 per month for his services***" [Emphasis 
added.] 
The only evidence relating to actual intent on this 
question is that of Paul S. Roberts, who drew the 
partnership articles. His testimony was that the draw· 
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ing account for Terry was to be $500.00 "provided 
that there was enough profits to pay that" (R. 104) . 
The form of judgment should have been amended 
to make the provisions set out in paragraph 12 of the 
plaintiff's motion to amend, since only in a form such 
as that can the receiver make an accurate determination 
of the amounts of money to be paid to the various 
parties. 
v 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
c 
COSTS TO DEFENDANT. 
The judgment (R. 7 4) provided that the defend-
ants were to have their costs incurred in the action, 
which is out of harmony with the provisions of Rule 
54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It is submitted 
that in the instant case the plaintiff was the prevailing 
party in the action as a whole. It was an action for 
dissolution, winding up of partnership affairs, and 
distribution of the assets. The dissolution was ordered, 
the partnership was wound up at the instance and 
request of the plaintiff, the assets being sold by a 
receiver, and the assets distributed. Moreover, prior 
to the trial of this action the defendants had taken the 
position that the plaintiff was not entitled to return of 
any of the amounts he had contributed to the partner-
ship, except only 40% of the remaining assets after the 
payment of non-partner creditors. 
39 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In pointing this out, we recognize that the act.ion 
of the trial court is probably not prejudicial error, since 
a final judgment as to the manner of awarding cost is 
to abide the final determination of the cause. It is 
pointed out, however, so that this court can make a 
determination and a direction to the trial court with 
respect to costs. 
As stated in the compiler's notes to Rule 54(d), 
"it is intended, however, that the court will follow the 
former practice, insofar as applicable in assessing costs" 
-that is the practice based upon the prior statute that 
costs would be awarded to the prevailing party as a 
mtater of course. There is nothing in the record which 
would justify deviation from that course in this case. 
VI 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW ARE INCONSISTENT WITH 
THE COURT'S MINUTE ENTRY OF DECI-
SION AND IN LARGE PART ARE NOT THE 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ·oF THE 
COURT. 
Although it is common practice for courts to have 
counsel prepare findings of fact, this case points up the 
problems that can be created when the trial court after 
having arrived at a basis for its decision, permits counsel 
to prepare findings of fact which are inconsistent with 
the trial court's original theory, and are drawn with an 
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eye to upholding the judgment at any cost, rather than 
preserving an accurate record of the basis of the trial 
court's judgment. 
In this case the court in its minute entry of deci-
sion purported to be basing its findings upon a determi-
nation of the "meaning" of the articles of partnership-
though it did not make a finding with respect to actual 
intent upon which the meaning was based. The findings 
of fact as prepared by, counsel do not restrict themselves 
to the basis of the trial court's minute entry of decision 
but go off in all directions, finding the meaning of the 
articles of partnership, generally; that a gift was made 
somehow, sometime; the non-meaning of a dissolution 
agreement; and, generally, that the parties are "bound 
by" the dissolution agreement. 
Although appellate courts have been reluctant to 
reverse decisions of trial courts because of the dele-
gation to counsel of preparation of findings of fact, 
the practice has been criticized, and perhaps this is a 
proper case for the court to place some restrictions upon 
trial courts in this regard. The following statement 
by Judge J. Skelly Wright of the Court of Appeals 
of the District of Columbia was quoted with approval 
by the United States Supreme Court in United States 
v. El Paso Natural Gas Company~ 876 U.S. 651, 12 L. 
Ed. 12, 84 Sup. Ct. 1044: 
"Who shall prepare the findings? Rule 52 
says the court shall prepare the findings. 'The 
court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law.' We all know 
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what has happened. Many courts simply decide 
the case in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant 
have him prepare the findings of fact and con~ 
elusions of law and sign them. This has been 
denounced by every court of appeals save one 
This is an abandonment of the duty and th~ 
trust t~at. has been plac~d in the judge by these 
r?les. It IS a .non-compliance with Rule 52 ,spe· 
cifically and It betrays the primary purpose of 
Rule 52-the primary purpose being that the 
preparation of these findings by the judge shall 
assist in the adjudication of lawsuit * * * 
''When these findings get to the courts of 
appeal they won't be worth the paper they are 
written on as far as assisting the court of ap-
peals in determining wh)r the judge decided the 
case." 
See also Welch Company of California v. Strolee 
of California~ Inc.~ 290 F.2d 509, in which the findings 
of the trial court were set aside because a United States 
Court of Appeals was wholly unable to determine how 
the trial court reached its conclusions; and United 
States v. Forness~ 125 F.2d 928, in which the late Judge 
Jerome Frank set out cogent reasons for having a trial 
judge prepare his own findings. 
CONCLUSION 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
as prepared by counsel and signed by the court are such 
a hodge-podge of conclusions, and designed for so many 
different purposes, that it is impossible to determine 
the basis for the trial court's judgment. The trial court 
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disregarded the direction of this court to make findings 
of fact with respect to the actual intent of the parties 
in executing the Articles of Partnership and the Dis-
solution Agreement. The end result was a court-im-
posed compromise based upon a theory not advanced 
by any party, but moulded to almost-fit defendants' 
theory. 
But remand of the case for preparation of findings 
by the trial court, unless he is instructed to prepare the 
findings himself on the basis of the manner in which 
he was impressed by the evidence, might serve no pur-
pose since it could result only in addition findings being 
prepared by counsel to suit his theory and uphold the 
judgment. Upon examining the evidence, this court 
can decide, here and now, that the plaintiff is entitled 
to a decree which in effect returns to him the capital 
contributions made to the partnership, (except perhaps 
the initial $.48,500.00) , prior to distribution of any 
assets to the defendants. 
The defendants' continued insistence that they were 
-----"~· promised a gift cannot now be construed as considera-
tion. Consideration for a contract must be bargained 
for as such, and defendants' attitude toward the trans-
action was that there wasn't any bargain - only the 
promise of a gift . 
.....;,;;;;,;;;~~ 
The gifts, even if promised, never were consum-
. mated, and it was ultimately necessary for the plaintiff 
to obtain appointment of receiver for the purpose of 
-~~selling the property and distributing the assets. 
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Finally, it is clear that there was no intention 011 
the part of Rulon to make a gift to Terry and Flora-
certainly no expressed intention on his part to donate 
40lfo of all the contributions he might thereafter make 
at the spectific request of Terry. Flora had no under-
standing of the transaction at all, except as gleaned 
from the partnership articles and related to her by 
Terry. Even Terry did not testify that Rulon promised 
him 40<fo of such capital as he might thereafter put 
into the partnership. He admits that the capital put in 
by Rulon was to be credited to his capital account; and 
the claim that Terry was entitled to share in Rulon's 
capital comes entirely fro1n a self-serving assumption 
based on a statement he says his father made that the 
partnership articles might be so drawn that Terry could 
be "protected" in event of dissolution. 
The proof falls far short of that necessary to 
establish an agreement that Rulon's capital would not 
be returned to him. Therefore the provisions of 48-1-15 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 must be applied and capital 
should be repaid to the partners as provided in the 
Utah Partnership Act. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
Fabian & Clendenin 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
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